I think it is important to reiterate just how impermanent a metaphysics can be so that there is no misunderstanding as to the nature of our metaphysics in this discussion. It is important. This is true. But it needs to be recognized that metaphysics are, first, a dime a dozen. This may seem to cheapen them, but without at least some coherent metaphysics underlying one’s hierology the rest falls away unfounded.

I believe that Whitehead, in Process and Reality, actually puts this into perspective best. So I will allow him to make this point much more succinctly than myself.

Metaphysics is nothing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice.

Is the question of god important? Yes. But it is still little more than a generality that must be assumed in order to examine the details of a praxis coherently. Whitehead continues on, saying:

At the best such a [metaphysical] system will remain only an approximation to the general truths which are sought. In particular, there are no precisely stated axiomatic certainties from which to start. There is not even the language in which to frame them. The only possible procedure is to start from verbal expression which, when taken by themselves with the current meaning of their words, are ill-defined and ambiguous. These are premises to be immediately reasoned from apart from elucidation by further discussion; they are endeavours to state general principles which will be exemplified in the subsequent description of the facts of experience. This subsequent elaboration should elucidate the meanings to be assigned to the words and phrases employed. Such meanings are incapable of accurate apprehension apart from a correspondingly accurate apprehension of the metaphysical background which the universe provides for them. But no language can be anything but elliptical, requiring a leap of the imagination to understand its meaning in its relevance to immediate experience. The position of metaphysics in the development of culture cannot be understood without remembering that no verbal statement is the adequate expression of a proposition. (13, bold emphasis mine)

I’d like to stress Whitehead’s final sentence in which he states that we must keep in mind “that no verbal statement”—and the written word, such as in this blog, is merely verbal statements in print, so to speak—”is the adequate expression of a proposition.” We know that any metaphysics is going to be inadequate but yet a coherent metaphysics is necessary for our systematic approach to hierology. I’ve said this in the past, but I’ll reiterate it here again: just because language is inadequate to express certain concepts is no reason to not express certain concepts in the most adequate way possible. Assuming an unfathomable expression of god is no reason to suggest that fathomable expressions of god are improper. So long as the inadequacies are acknowledged, many different hurdles are laid to rest as stumbling blocks to discussion and progress.

The Metaphysical Presupposition

The metaphysical presupposition is probably one of the most difficult aspects of a thelemic worldview. There are those who we know are all too willing to accept some half-baked tales about inspired or dictated religious texts but are not willing to accept the existence of a god who did the inspiring or the dictating or need to devise elaborate psychological excuses to ease their faith. They mix and match their own metaphysical assumptions on top of a foundation that cannot hold water, metaphysical or otherwise. The end result is a lack of consistency or comprehension over the subject matter at all.

This assumes, of course, that we can ever come to an agreement on the existence and nature of god in the first place. But this is a vital piece of a thelemic worldview. It is a vicious but self-referential cycle the importance of which cannot be underestimated. For if we accept the veracity and validity of the Book of the Law, then we must assume some form of god in existence. If we accept some form of god in existence, then there is no obvert reason to dismiss the Book of the Law as a product of something intimately related to that god.

We should examine some terminology. I make absolutely no claims that this particular study is complete by any means. Should I take this further at a later point, I would add several more layers of discussion not only for the main bullet points but also for any direct conclusion I offered.

Theism and Deism

Theism is the belief in the existence of a god or gods, especially belief in a personal God as creator and ruler of the world. Deism, on the other hand, is the belief—based solely on reason—in a God who created the universe and then abandoned it, assuming no control over life, exerting no influence on natural phenomena, and giving no supernatural revelation. I don’t think that a lot of deists see the “abandoned” part very much or take it too seriously. It’s more of an agnostic approach than a formal denial. Or at least such has been my minimal experience with professed deists thus far.

There isn’t a whole lot of difference between theism and deism. For the most part, theism is more faith based whereas deism is more reason based. I don’t think this necessarily holds out in practice very well, but I can at least accept the academic differences on paper. The end result is a difference in whether God takes a personal interest in the universe or just doesn’t bother with the personal touch.

The Law of Thelema would lean more toward a theistic approach over deism—assuming a strict definition. The revelation of the Book of the Law would lend a sense of a more than less personal interest of some form of divinity into the progress and development of mankind. It may not be quite to the extent of a personal relationship as some religions have with their god—e.g., Christianity with Christ—but it is an interest nonetheless that may be just enough to separate a pure deist perspective from a more moderate theist one.

Most pagans, like most Christians, proclaim a theistic devotion while practicing a deistic worldview. That is to say, God is great so long as God stays in his own playground and comes out only when called. The only substantial difference between pagans and Christians is the prefix poly- added to the former’s particular -ism or -ic of choice.

Atheism

It is not really any surprise that atheism—disbelief in or denial of the existence of God or gods—is specifically dismissed by the Law of Thelema. This does not take into consideration Crowley’s word play with the term atheist in his essay Gematria. I generally agree with his use there, but it does not make for consistency in thought. The only academic usefulness it possesses is the third type: “The philosophical adept, who, knowing God, says ‘There is No God,’ meaning ‘God is Zero,’ as qabalistically He is.” In this, it is not atheism by definition but atheism by acknowledgement of the incomprehensible. This kind of theism/atheism is beyond the scope of this investigation while still being acknowledged as a more specialized and enlightened perspective of divinity.

Pantheism

I have to immediately discard pantheism as intrinsic to a thelemic worldview for the simple reason that our Trinitarian (Hexatarian—Dual Trinitarian?) theogony is made up of interlaced forms and functions rather than independent gods and goddess. As simply as possible, though without any suggestion of completeness, Nuit is the infinitely infinite; Hadit is the infinitely finite; Ra-Hoor-Khuit is the intersection of those two extremes. This is, as I mentioned, extremely simplistic.

All through the Book of the Law there is both specific communication as well as general metaphysical constructions that indicate that these relationships between our “gods” are symbiotic and symbolic.

Panentheism

Does the universe take form and communicate? Probably. We have a multitude of evidence that would suggest this is true. However, we should separate how we approach divinity in the sense of the “All” and in the sense of our personal perceptions of the “All.” If we see the singular Nuit as the embodiment of this “All” then we are then defining her as fully transcendent and transrational while fully immanent and observable. This is as close to the proper definition of panentheism as it gets.

When approaching this perspective there is a type of dialectical monism that comes into play. I don’t want to compare it directly to panentheism, but certainly there is a common playground between them. I’m not convinced, personally speaking, that there is enough examination into this particular theory to draw conclusions quite yet. But I do think that it is worth the time to explore.

Conclusion

In the end, and at least online, I am not going to take a specific stand on this issue with any definitive notions. I will suggest that I think the Law of Thelema presents a panentheistic, a henotheistic, or even, by extension, a kathenotheistic worldview as most probable for its metaphysical presupposition. In each case there is a cognizant divinity that is capable of being expressed or manifested in different, individual ways while being transcendent and above reason itself.

The presupposition that will be used here is that the divine, by whatever name one wishes to label it, is both inherent (a bit deeper than merely “immanent”) and transcendent and, at the same time, embodies both the manifest and occult (ambiguous, concealed, hidden, obscure) reality by whatever perception one has of those concepts. Language may be (and it is) inadequate to describe the nature of god in either positive or negative terms to any proper satisfaction, but that should not inhibit us from communicating our observations either way. We cannot say that god is a certain way but we can say that we perceive god is or is not a certain way or to have or to not have certain traits.

This stance may be labeled by some as panentheistic. There are those who are familiar with such theology who would disagree. But if we need a term immediately to satisfy our legalistic need for definitions, panentheistic might as well be as good as any other for the moment.

The Prolegomena is the actual beginning of the preconditions that we need to set out in discussing a thelemic worldview. It is here that we determine several different pylons on which we will build up our worldview from scratch. These range from the metaphysical to the revelational to the hermeneutical to the methodological and on to other presuppositions that need to be addressed and understood for any thelemic worldview to be comprehensive and, ultimately, to be comprehendible.

So here we go—

The Law of Thelema presupposes* that there is a spiritual holarchy to which individuals relate in a variety of individual perspectives (metaphysical presupposition) and from which intervention is possible that may be perceived by some as miraculous (preternatural presupposition) and also from which the revelation of the nature of the universe is found in a general and special revelation (revelational presupposition); this revelation has a relationship with reason while being capable of transrational experiences (rational-experiential presupposition), contains objective and meaningful statements (semantical presupposition) which are true on several different levels (epistemological presupposition) and can be understood through analogous language (linguistic presupposition) which then may be systematized through a comprehensive hierological method (methodological presupposition).

That’s the basics. Or at least my working draft of the basics. I haven’t worked out each one precisely yet, but I’m getting there. I may also end up changing at least one but also adding two more. I haven’t finished those studies yet so I’m not sure if they particularly hold water as necessary for a systematic approach. Being challenged to explain a thelemic worldview can be a daunting task but it is an incredible adventure. Some of my terms and conclusions may change a bit as I work through each of these. But that’s okay. That is one reason why we do studies like this.

*Those who are familiar with Norman Geisler’s incredible four volume Systematic Theology will certainly recognize the outline of presuppositions. While not a precise one-to-one match, but giving credit where credit is due, my own approach is heavily influenced by his work due to its clear and concise manner of writing and outlining the key topics and points needed to support his approach. I believe we have a lot to learn from those religions around us and should be mindful of both the approaches that work and those that don’t. “Test all things—hold on to that which is good no matter its origin.”

The second precondition is really more of a sideline. This is not to say it is unimportant, but it really isn’t a precondition as much as it is a scaffolding that is necessary to form the parameters in which good exegesis and study can occur. I probably should have started out the last precondition and this one with a label of pre-precondition since they really undergird this whole discussion. But, alas, what is is what is. This is a blog, not a graduate thesis. Get over it already.

All of life is a hermeneutic process. Every time you see a red light and stop your car while waiting for it to turn green is a process that involves hermeneutics. Reading Dostoevsky or Tolstoy or Rand or Crowley or Dr. Suess is all about hermeneutics. The manner in which we approach the interpretation of various things with which we interact is what hermeneutics is all about. We would not read Green Eggs & Ham with the same perspective or approach as we that with which we would read Paradise Lost. It would be silly at best. But the point here is that we cannot escape “doing” hermeneutics or going through a process of hermeneutics. So it comes down to what is the best approach.

Spoken or unspoken, written or unwritten, there are rules by which one tackles a given subject. When it comes to things like textual criticism or theology, many times those rules are understood to keep us within a certain frame of mind as well as open up doors that might otherwise be overlooked by too narrow of an approach.

One of the first things I wrote for the Society for Thelemic Literature was the (Proposed) Rule Concerning Thelemic Hermeneutics. It ran something like this:

• Rule One: Each Scripture must be understood within, though not limited to, a grammatical, historical, mythological, prophetic, qaballistic, religious, and social context.
• Rule Two: Personal integrity, intellectual honesty, common sense and a quality of rational inspiration are required in order to analyze and discriminate between a principle of truth and a dogma of convenience.
• Rule Three: The principle underlying each Scripture or statement of counsel or instruction must be recognized in order to understand its relevance for those in different times or places including our contemporary era.
• Rule Four: Two Scriptures that seem to contradict each other by appearances must wait until a third Scripture arrives and resolves their apparent contradiction.
• Rule Five: Spiritual application must overcome historical accuracy as interpretation may involve multiple layers of meaning and must take into account mystical and qaballistic modes inherent in the text.
• Rule Six: Careful consideration must be given to the production of an exegesis that it does not devolve into a personal verse-by-verse commentary that is presented as a matter of truth.
• Rule Seven: Though the potential for contradicting themselves exists in the written word, we must allow for the maturing experience of authors and exegetes—even prophets—in that truth is unfolded to them only as fast as they are able to understand it.
• Rule Eight: Recognize progressive revelation through spiritual maturity, appreciate that all truth is revealed over time and meditation, and understand that any process of hermeneutics will necessarily be as incomplete as it is personal

The Rule is flexible and, of course, merely a proposal. It is not meant to limit discussion but to ensure a complete and yet functional set of parameters by which exegesis can occur. It also prohibits merely random free-for-alls that have little meaning in the first place. Serious study is the goal rather than merely an accident. This Rule also recognizes the importance of the personal and individual nature of the Law of Thelema while ensuring the door remains wide open for more social interpretations.

Also, I will be the first to admit that the Rule was written in response to the “anything goes” crowd who believe that Thelema can mean anything at all no matter how silly or how obviously erroneous a conclusion may be. Unlike some who believe that Thelema means something different for every single individual, I side with Umberto Eco on this when he wrote, “I accept the statement that a text can have many senses. I refuse the statement that a text can have every sense.” Dog can mean many different things. It can mean a Labrador Retriever, a Pug, a Border Collie, a German Shepherd, ad nauseam. But dog cannot mean cat. And it is for this simple reason that the Rule was designed. It is the buffer to maintain a sense of responsible exegesis against those who feel the need to insist that dogs are cats and Cthulhu really does, physically, slumber in the depths of the Pacific.

As previously mentioned—and let me be equally as clear again here—I find this to be a most ridiculous place to start a discussion on the makeup of a thelemic worldview, but the nature of the beast—no pun intended—seems to suggest that we must start out here in order to eliminate the most obvious issues and objections first.

Therefore …

The first precondition of a thelemic worldview is that it must, without any exceptions or qualifications, accept the veracity and validity of Liber AL vel Legis, the Book of the Law.

Nothing else added to that statement. It is my opinion that the rest falls into place once that precondition is affirmed, but there is nothing that must be added to that foundation in order for it to be a necessary cornerstone for a proper and balanced thelemic worldview.

The Book of the Law is self-referential. When asked by the Prophet and Scribe “write unto us the law” (AL 1.33), the immediate response was given: “the Law is for all” (AL 1.34). And then, finally, the clear identification of the Law itself. “This that thou writest is the threefold book of Law” (AL 1.35). The Book of the Law stands as the centerpiece of the Law of Thelema.

If there is one nice thing about Liber AL it is that we have the actual manuscript itself. I realize the other challenges that go with that but those are not the subject here. An extended review of this entire subject would be necessary and if I was going to do that, I’d write a book on the topic. (Wait. I am writing a book on the topic. My bad.) But since we do have the manuscript and it is in English, we don’t really have a whole lot to worry about. Right? Right!? Okay. Admittedly there are other issues to worry about, but translation from one language to another and to another and back again is just not one of those worries. It could be worse. It could be all sigils like Liber Arcanorvm των Atu του Tahuti Quas Vidit Asar in Amennti. Good luck to you there.

There are other holy books included in the thelemic protocanon. All but one are penned by the Prophet himself. They range from oddly prophetic to instructional to inspirational in nature.

What does this precondition mean by no exceptions or qualifications? I’m not a fan of O.T.O. doctrines, but I do believe that they provide a very minimal and workable perspective on this subject allowing for the widest possible interpretation without eliminating any rational basis for moving past it. In order to join the Order, one must agree to accept the Book of the Law without changes. There is no actual qualification of what “accept … without changes” means outside the affirmation that one accepts the Book of the Law without the need to add or subtract to the text itself. This is a very literal approach, but I see nothing that would prohibit such a notion from being a very minimal ideal. It make no claims as to how one accepts without change. That could be a very broad agnosticism or, just as easily, a fanatical blind adherence.

But further than this, there is the injunction within the Book of the Law itself that demands no changes. Twice it ensures its own textual integrity: “[The scribe] shall not in one letter change this book” (AL 1.36) and “The stops as thou wilt; the letters? change them not in style or value!” (AL 2.54).

Having made it this far, I think that the objections based on history and language are sufficient to afford a pause to examine them here even if only briefly.

One of the objections to the Book of the Law is that Thelema (or Θελημα, to be proper) predates the text itself. And so it does.

The Ghost of Rabelais

Some will suggest that this is the same as Rabelais’ “Abbey of Theleme” from Gargantua and Pantagruel that mirrors a phrase that has been variously interpreted as “Do what thou wilt” and “Do what you want.” There is certainly no dispute that there is a direct link between Rabelais and the central tenet of the Law of Thelema. But to suggest that it is relevant is about as helpful as indicating DaVinci drew sketches of airplane-like objects centuries before the invention of the airplane and should be, somehow, ultimately credited with our ability to fly from New York to Beijing. However, that said, we should fully admit that Rabelais was probably tapping into some emerging sense of Thelema even then.

But was it the Law of Thelema? No.

Backing it Back to Augustine

Augustine provided us with the protothelemic understanding of “Love and do what you will.” I sincerely doubt that anyone would mistake Augustine for a Thelemite. We should fully admit that Augustine was probably tapping into some emerging sense of Thelema even then.

But was it the Law of Thelema? No.

I think it is important to dive into a small tangent here if only to make Gerald a happy man.

Augustine, a couple of hundred years after the death of Christ, was not merely tapping into some kind of protothelemic ideal. It is my opinion that he was tapping into a particular “golden thread,” so to speak, that exists unchanging but reframed throughout each of the Aeons. Call it the actual source of the covenantal aspects of the Law and the Aeons that I’ve been hinting around.

With the Law of Thelema it is the doctrine of “Love is the law, love under will” (AL 1.57). It is from here that we take our first steps out of the old Aeon and into the new. So, for us, Thelema has reframed Christianity’s “for God so loved the world” (Joh 3.16 ESV) as much as Christianity reframed Judaism’s “Love your God” and “Love your neighbor as yourself” (cf. Deu 6.5, Lev 19.18).

And Speaking of the Devil

Jesus’ speeches and prayers were some of the first recorded uses of the Greek Θελημα in the New Testament. Probably the most famous and quoted is Christ’s Model Prayer in which he says, “ελθετω η βασιλεια σου γενηθητω το θελημα σου ως εν ουρανω και επι της γης”—”Your kingdom come, your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven” (Mat 6.10 ESV). The word Θελημα is used sixty times in the New Testament. And in every case it is used within a very narrow parameter of meaning.

But does mere word use make it the Law of Thelema? No.

Allow me to clarify a little something based on the perceptions of the Prophet: Crowley believed that the teachings of Christ was Thelema, but ended up in a twisted state by the disciples of Christ and packaged as Christianity instead. Personally, I’m not buying that, but I do understand why he would make such a claim. I just don’t think it holds water very well. Whatever Crowley may have assumed about the teachings of Christ, they do not properly fall within the realm of thelemic doctrine. His teachings undergirds the Law of Thelema just fine and as much as the law of Moses (still) undergirds Christian doctrine. I find no contradiction or problem with this at all. It is just not a very popular opinion in those circles where open rebellion against Christianity (or any form of organized religion) is practiced. The desire to be seen as juvenile antinomians over balanced spiritual seekers displaces reason and the pragmatic pursuit of truth with untenable subjectivism and arrogance. My response to such people is: get over it already.

So, to recap here:

The first precondition of a thelemic worldview is that it must, without any exceptions or qualifications, accept the veracity and validity of Liber AL vel Legis, the Book of the Law.

Without the Book of the Law, there is no Thelema. There are many, many things that Thelema currently enjoys that could be eliminated without destroying the baseline of what defines Thelema, but the Book of the Law is not one of those things. It is a vital part of the foundation of Thelema itself. The Prophet wrote, “Accept the Law, and everything is lawful. Refuse the Law, you put yourself beyond its pale” (Liber ABA, Part IV, Chapter VIII).

This is, of course, the barest of examinations. It does no justice to the topic at hand nor to the subject of the Book of the Law itself. But for an online review, it should suffice for the moment as a baseline for further conversation and study.

While I personally think this is a horrible way to start a study, it is an unfortunate necessity when it comes to any serious thelemic topic of discussion.

Christians usually start out their discussions on theology by debating the existence of their God. If their God exists then everything else in their religion falls into place nicely. The bible is valid because their God inspired it. Therefore if the bible is valid and inspired by their God then everything in it must be truthful. That’s the abbreviated version, but it hits the highlights fairly if reductively and from there it merely rolls downhill gathering speed and moss.

I find it to be an interesting study by its own right that any religion necessitates discussing the validity of its sacred text before any discussion of its core beliefs. For if a god or set of gods or merely an intelligence higher than humanity is capable of communicating with man, then it seems that should be one of the first assumptions of a religion. When it comes to Thelema, however, it is my assertion that we approach our hierology very, very badly.

Personally speaking, I think that most Thelemites are backwards in their approach to religion and spirituality more than just about any other religion on the planet. But because there are so many that are caught up in the necroguruism of the last six decades, sometimes it takes a backwards approach to open the doors of the mind and soul to a different way of looking at Thelema.

The question was submitted to me by an outsider: what constitutes a thelemic worldview? I shall begin to endeavor to answer that question with as much direct evidence as I can.